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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This chapter develops a critique of linear conceptions of time in political economy, 
showing how these have produced a vision of historical change at odds with the strange 
realities of financial capitalism. It then advocates a turn from economics and finance 
theory to the theory and philosophy of history. To support this, the chapter addresses the 
seam between history and finance in three ways. First, it emphasizes how historical 
discourse has produced an enduring mode of subjectivity distinct to the one associated 
with economic discourse. Second, it shows how contemporary narratives of 
financialization bespeak a desire more properly belonging to the domain of history than 
either economy or finance. Finally, it introduces a concept of the ‘strange loop,’ intended 
to capture a form of feedback between historical discourse and the process of historical 
change or development, such that every attempt to imagine history becomes a potential 
input back into it. 
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Introduction: “We live in financial times” 
In April 2007, The Financial Times introduced a new format for its printed editions in the United 
Kingdom, Europe, Asia, and North America. To accompany the redesign it launched a global 
branding campaign around three flagship images. One featured a series of great white sharks of 
different sizes, the smaller being swallowed up by the larger. The title caption ran “Mergers and 
Acquisitions.” Another depicted “World Business” in the form of an imaginary island state 
whose skyline included recognizable business buildings from across the world, including the 
New York Stock Exchange, Commerzbank Tower in Frankfurt, the Gherkin in London, and 
Hong Kong’s IFC 2. The third image, “Business Revolutionaries,” featured Virgin Group CEO 
Richard Branson’s face incorporated into the iconic red and black portrait of Che Guevara. All 
three carried the same slogan: “We live in financial times.”  
To a certain extent this is unremarkable—just another marketing exercise of the kind 
we’ve seen before and will see again. In hindsight, however, the campaign has acquired a 
different, deeper kind of significance. The pithy slogan and surreal images evoke the spirit of the 
late 2000s, celebrating the ceaseless dynamism and compression of space-time that many 
thought to characterize the era. Yet at the same time, they now also suggest a later puncturing of 
these very myths. As one columnist tells it, looking back on their time at the newspaper: “The 
free-market model engulfing the US and European economies seemed untouchable as the West 
enjoyed the fruits of global wealth. Then came the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 
2008 and our certainties were rocked.”1 The ‘crisis’ that followed struck a mortal blow to the 
manifest destiny of liberal finance, replacing a seemingly self-evident assertion—“we live in 
financial times”—with a series of searching questions about the evolution of financial markets, 
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their recurring bouts of instability, and the challenges these pose to existing modes of financial 
governance. For newspapers like The Financial Times, which took a reformist turn after 2008, 
such questions were primarily engaged as technical problems for regulators and policymakers. 
Elsewhere a more classically liberal focus on the automatic adjustment and regeneration of 
markets was maintained. But beyond the familiar oppositions between state and market or left 
and right, these questions also revealed a new and radical uncertainty about the logics of 
economic and political change, about the kind of present these had produced, and about the 
possible futures that might be forged through such a moment. In this sense, the questions 
unleashed by the events of 2008 belong as much to the domain of what used to be called the 
‘philosophy of history’ as they do the field of economics. 
The aim of this book is to elaborate and enact a philosophy of history fit for the world of 
contemporary global finance. In some ways, this is an untimely move. The age of neoliberalism 
is often thought to correspond with an extinguishing of history by economics, such that 
everything appears and is administered through the logics of investment, appreciation, and 
growth.2 And yet try as we might to banish the big questions, “we remain haunted by history, 
returning ever and again to the big story” about where we are, how we got here, and what comes 
next.3 This is especially so when conventional wisdoms lose their power, as they did for those 
employed in the financial sector during 2007-08. Faced with a radical deterioration of the market 
for US mortgages and related securities, investors and fund managers were left “reaching for the 
history books.”4 Politicians, technocrats, and journalists too scrambled around for clues and 
lessons in the past, while scholars from various disciplines began the slower work of putting the 
meltdown of 2008 in a longer, explicitly historical perspective. ‘How,’ the now familiar question 
has it, ‘did the world arrive at the brink of financial collapse?’ 
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One popular response charts a transformation from simple economies of exchange into a 
globally integrated, abstract, and self-referential economy of financial claims in which more 
money is produced than can ever be spent. This is the narrative of runaway finance, and it has 
proved influential across the humanities and social sciences.5 Another response, which has its 
roots in anthropology and heterodox economic thought, tells us that economic action is always 
more than it seems—that economic practices partake in a ritual reproduction of social order, and 
that this is even so in the futuristic economies of high-tech finance. This is the narrative of 
finance as a crypto-mythological regime of power.6 Neither narrative can alone do justice to the 
mysteries of contemporary finance. Somewhere between the autonomy of financial operations 
and the deep embeddedness of finance in society is a zone where these two logics commingle; 
where the endless frontiers of financial capitalism are met by the hopes and fears of homo 
historia. This is a book about what happens in that zone. It is a book about the historical names, 
concepts, and archetypes that suffuse the present, and the peculiar ways these enroll us into 
evolving economies of contemporary finance. In short, it is a book about how we imagine and 
produce history in financial times. 
In this sense, a key premise of the book is that the ‘crisis’ of 2008 was more than a 
breakdown in the functioning of financial markets and their regulation. It was also, and perhaps 
more fundamentally, a breakdown in the language that economics provides, which has proved 
unable to grasp the crucial functions that ‘history’ is called upon to perform in contemporary life. 
In particular, the economic imagination remains wedded to simplistic conceptions of time that 
obscure the reflexive, non-linear character of history in its developmental aspect. This is evident 
across a wide range of traditions in economic thought, albeit in different ways. The case of 
conventional economics is most straightforward. Building on developments in early physics, 
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classical thinkers like Adam Smith imagined a kind of cosmic mechanics at work behind the 
earthly activities of production, exchange, and consumption. Modern economists then moved to 
formalize this idea using the tools of statistical mechanics, ascribing analogous laws of motion, 
limits, and distributional properties first to commodity markets and then to financial ones.7 The 
end result has been a set of models in which time figures as a mere medium for processes of 
market adjustment. This is a purely logical conception of time, derived from the model-world 
rather than world history. It continues to form the basis for neoclassical economics and finance 
theory in particular. 
 Unsurprisingly, heterodox theorists have long cast this as the Achilles heel of 
conventional economics. Karl Marx, for example, was highly critical of Smith and other classical 
thinkers for mystifying the origins of capitalism, while Thorstein Veblen, Maynard Keynes, and 
Karl Polanyi sought to push beyond the neoclassical framework, exploring novel aspects of 
economy as it operated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Despite their 
numerous differences, these critical thinkers all worked with a broadly modern, scientific image 
of time premised on the worldview of the clock, leading them to theorize not only markets in 
general, but also the way specific market economies evolved over decades and centuries. These 
days, a chronological conception of time serves as the bedrock principle for any self-consciously 
historical form of economics. This can be traced back to a set of mid-century debates over the 
role of time in neoclassical theory, to which Keynes and a number of his contemporaries made 
decisive contributions. It was Joan Robinson, however, who first explicitly framed the question 
of economic time in terms of ‘history.’8 According to Robinson, the logical time of equilibrium 
was at odds with the irreversible character of historical time, which manifested as “an ever-
moving break between the irrevocable past and the unknown future.”9 “‘Today’ is at the front 
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edge of time,” she wrote. “It moves continuously forward with an ever lengthening past behind 
it.”10 Rather than wishing this fact of life away, the task facing the historical economist, as 
Robinson saw it, was to mediate between a set past and an uncertain future—to sift through the 
travel logs of history, reconstructing its causal logics and using these to make predictions about 
where it might lead us next. “History,” as Hyman Minsky once put it, “is an input to theory 
formation.”11 Few have been so explicit as the Post-Keynesians, but Robinson’s guidelines for 
historical research are upheld across a wide range of political economy approaches, including 
those associated with Marxist and institutional economics.12 
As far as assumptions go, there are good things to be said about the idea that ‘history’ 
flies forward on the back of time’s arrow. It is, for example, a perfectly reasonable way of 
grappling with chains of cause and effect. Did the subprime crisis cause a shift in practices of 
financial regulation? Are there broader patterns in the relationship between financial crisis and 
regulatory change that can be inferred from the historical record? Such questions can be 
answered by equating historical time with chronological time—but at what cost? This book 
argues that the linear, essentialist conception of time misses something crucial about the 
dynamics of contemporary capitalism. Time may seem to flow in one direction (when we follow 
the movements of the stock markets, for example), but oftentimes the sequence is scrambled. 
Sometimes ‘time’ folds back on itself, such that the present takes shape through a vista of 
imagined pasts and projected futures (we remember the Great Depression, or we spy another on 
the horizon). This is the reflexive, non-linear aspect of temporal experience, and it is central to 
the character of historical time. Historical time emerges through the historical imagination—that 
is what makes it historical. 
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All this impacts on what we usually think of as ‘history’ itself, because it opens up a 
series of strange loops between the historical imagination and the developmental aspects of 
history as a process. The future can act on the present, for example, through different modes of 
anticipation. By formatting the expectations held by public and private agents, these can shape 
the patterns of order that emerge from the economic process. This is fast becoming a key theme 
for cutting-edge research in economic sociology, cultural economy, and the new field of ‘finance 
and society’ studies.13 Less acknowledged are the strange loops between present and past. These 
consist in a recursive action of the past on the present. Rather than each present leaving a set past 
behind it, the past circulates within the present as an evolving repertoire of abstract patterns—
names, concepts, archetypes, and so on, all drawn from the recorded past and our efforts to give 
it order. These patterns are best viewed not as ‘real’ historical legacies, but instead as vectors of 
the historical imagination—specifically modern modes of organizing temporal experience that 
derive their power from the discourse of history and our familiarity with it. The result, I argue, is 
a quasi-historical process—a strange history—in which the recollected past shapes the way we 
apprehend and negotiate the present. The aim of this book is to explore such a process in the 
context of contemporary financial capitalism. 
By way of introduction, this chapter brings questions of time and history to bear on 
contemporary finance in three ways. First, it emphasizes how historical discourse has produced 
an enduring mode of subjectivity distinct to the one associated with economic discourse. Second, 
it reflects on the way contemporary narratives of financialization bespeak a desire more properly 
belonging to the domain of history than that of either economy or finance. Finally, it positions 
my approach within the theory and philosophy of history, distinguishing the logic of the ‘strange 
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loop’ from contextualist and genealogical approaches to historical study, then briefly outlining 
the arguments put forward in each of the subsequent chapters. 
 
Homo oeconomicus and homo historia 
 
“The hedonistic conception of man is that of a lightning calculator of pleasures and pains, who 
oscillates like a homogeneous globule of desire of happiness under the impulse of stimuli that 
shift him about the area, but leave him intact. He has neither antecedent nor consequence.”14 So 
wrote Veblen in 1898, putting his finger on the anemic character of the human imagined by 
economists. His is among the more colorful critiques of this kind, but by no means the first or the 
last. For as long as there has been a concept of the economic, there has been a conception of the 
human in keeping with this, and as economists have coalesced around a set of assumptions about 
human behavior, the name homo oeconomicus has become shorthand for these. Proponents of the 
figure emphasize its status as a theoretical construct, while its detractors have typically 
underlined how it fails to do justice to the complexity of human motivation. In recent decades, 
however, critical attention has turned from the theoretical to the practical significance of homo 
oeconomicus, and in particular, to how the figure works to produce subjects in its own image. 
With this comes a sense that economic (or indeed financial) considerations are emerging as the 
governing rationality of contemporary life. 
 The key reference point in this regard is the work of Michel Foucault, and in particular 
his late lectures on The Birth of Biopolitics.15 In these, Foucault develops a reading of 
neoliberalism premised on a transformation in the figure of homo oeconomicus. To cut a long 
story short, Foucault links a series of claims about human nature in classical economics to a set 
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of principles associated with the liberal art of government, suggesting that the image of the 
human as a “partner of exchange” (226) was integral to the rise of commercial society in 
eighteenth-century Europe. He then identifies a theoretical shift by which the human is instead 
imagined as an “entrepreneur of himself” (226), linking this figure to an emergent neoliberal 
form of government in the late twentieth century. The result is a broader argument about the 
practical effects associated with new forms of economic knowledge: “From being the intangible 
partner of laissez-faire, homo oeconomicus now becomes the correlate of a governmentality 
which will act on the environment and systematically modify its variables” (270-71). We can at 
this point return to Veblen’s “homogeneous globule of desire.” The contemporary economic 
subject, according to Foucault, is a subject based on a desire not for utility but productivity, and 
the “stimuli that shift him about the area” are not simply given but instead are actively produced 
through governmental practice. This form of intervention positions government within the 
market process, establishing “a general regulation of society by the market” (145) that 
distinguishes neoliberal rule from its classical predecessor. 
 Foucault’s analysis has been influential in recent years for a number of reasons. Among 
these is the stress he puts on overcoming the dichotomy between state and market—a conceptual 
move that has been borne out by a broad shift toward interventionist policy across a range of 
market-friendly institutions.16 Another is the way he theorizes this shift as an economization of 
state, civil society, and a host of other domains previously thought to be non-economic in 
character.17 This resonates with contemporary fears about the further privatization of public 
health, the destruction of the university as a place of learning, and a range of other front-line 
battles against the march of economic reason. It also intersects with growing concerns over the 
power of finance in society. Indeed for some, the re-emergence of global finance constitutes a 
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new phase in the evolution of neoliberal rule, grounded in a further but now all-powerful 
iteration of homo oeconomicus. This, for example, is the diagnosis offered by Wendy Brown in 
her book Undoing the Demos.18 
For Brown, the incipient neoliberalism of Foucault’s time has been overtaken by a new 
formation in which finance has displaced industry as the fulcrum of economic growth, and 
portfolio rather than capital investment has become its anchoring logic. Subjects within this 
formation are constituted as “self-investing human capital” (83), “relentlessly committed to 
appreciating [their] own individual value” (102). But the consequence is more than a refiguring 
of homo oeconomicus in the image of finance. With this, she argues, comes a triumph of homo 
oeconomicus over other figures of the human. Brown’s primary concern is with politics and the 
democratic imaginary,19 but her argument opens out onto questions of history and the historical 
imagination in interesting ways. In particular, she highlights the constitutive opposition through 
which homo oeconomicus comes into being. “Every image of man is defined against other 
possibilities—thus, the idea of man as fundamentally economic is drawn against the idea of him 
as fundamentally political, loving, religious, ethical, social, moral, tribal, or something else.” She 
continues: “Even when one image becomes hegemonic, it carves itself against a range of other 
possibilities—tacitly arguing with them, keeping them at bay, or subordinating them” (81). It is 
on this basis that Brown reads the triumph of homo oeconomicus as a triumph over homo 
politicus, tracing the way the latter has shadowed the former through much of modernity, only to 
be threatened with extinction by a stealth revolution that would reduce man to “a speck of 
capital” (94). But as we know from psychoanalysis, the act of repression always brings with it 
the prospect of return, and in this case the return of a figure of the human conceived through the 
lens of something other than economy or finance. This is one way to read Brown’s story about 
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the death of homo politicus—it is a call to bring that figure back to life. Here, however, I want to 
suggest a different reading, organized around the enduring presence of homo historia. 
 If homo oeconomicus is shadowed or haunted by its others, then from where do these 
specters emanate? The answer, more or less explicit in both Foucault and Brown, is that these 
figures are conjured into being through knowledge practices.20 But if we accept this analysis, 
then we must consider the possibility that historical knowledge has a role to play in producing 
and regulating subjectivities. This is straightforwardly so in the sense that a vast body of 
knowledge and techniques has been built up around the idea of ‘history,’ taking shape alongside 
those associated with ‘economy.’ Just as economic discourse can be understood in terms of its 
practical effects and functions, so too can historical discourse. Indeed, according to Michel de 
Certeau, this is precisely how we should understand historical discourse—as a technique for 
producing “a society capable of managing the space it provides for itself.”21 But the point is not 
to position historical reason as a substitute for economic reason; the latter continually relies on 
the former in ways it struggles to acknowledge. In particular, there is a sense in which the 
narrative logic of historical reason works away at the margins or in the background of other 
discourses, providing a sense of antecedent, trajectory, and possibility that would otherwise be 
missing from a purely economic or financial perspective. There is, in other words, a way of 
being, knowing, and governing associated with ‘history’ that persists despite the apparent 
economization of everything. Even at its moment of triumph, homo oeconomicus is haunted by 
homo historia. 
So who is homo historia? In simple terms, homo historia is ‘historical man,’ or the 
human conceived through the lens of history (rather than economy, society, and so on). More 
pointedly, it is a form of subjectivity associated with the operation of historical discourse. The 
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development of this discourse will be taken up at length in Chapter 2, but the upshot is that the 
machinery of historiography, as de Certeau calls it, presents the subject with a double bind. On 
the one hand, the narrativity of historical writing provides a sense of orderly succession around 
which one can orient oneself in the world. But in order to for this effect to obtain, one must go on 
as if each ‘new’ time is separate from the past through which it is imagined. Speaking to this 
dynamic, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari use the term homo historia to designate the kind of 
subject that comes into being through a mixing up of past and present, future and past.22 The 
example they give is the late Friedrich Nietzsche, whose descent into madness is taken to reveal 
something of the competing demands placed on life by the discourse of history. Both the past 
and the future are omnipresent, yet one is reminded at every step not to breach the coordinates of 
linear succession; not to embody and channel the entanglements upon which history is itself 
based. Nietzsche went too far and ended up sobbing on the neck of a horse (or so they say). Here 
I want to expand the meaning of the term by using homo historia as a name for the subject that 
must somehow negotiate these competing demands; the subject that seeks solace in historical 
discourse, yet cannot help but do so by disobeying its rules; the subject that imagines and 
produces something called ‘history’ precisely through an anhistorical mixing up of past, present, 
and future.  
More concretely, the characteristic condition of homo historia is undergirded by a 
number of distinct affinities and compulsions. One of these is a backward orientation, which sees 
the subject of history respond to present puzzles or dilemmas by looking to the past for guidance. 
Paul Valéry called this “historical-mindedness,” a kind of impulse that “presents the imagination 
with a chart of situations and disasters, a gallery of ancestors, a formulary of acts, expressions, 
attitudes, and decisions, which offer themselves to our instability and uncertainty in order to help 
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us to become.”23 Related to this is an affinity for the future, which figures as a site of 
consequence and meaning for present events and actions. It is to this that Valéry alludes when he 
speaks of ‘becoming,’ and there are numerous other inflections of the idea in modern Western 
philosophy, especially in the so-called continental tradition. Martin Heidegger, for instance, 
famously saw this temporal structure as a quality of Being itself, rather than a mere cognitive 
projection of homo historia. Nevertheless, he also thought that world history and historical being 
would equally be structured around a ‘from’ and a ‘towards.’24 Finally, there is the enduring 
compulsion to repeat the loop just described, to return to the past and project into the future, over 
and again, in order to make sense of it all—‘all’ meaning here every situation we find ourselves 
in; every disaster that befalls us (or indeed others); and every act or decision that surrounds 
these, stretching from the present back into the past as far as memory and record will allow. This 
amounts to a search for rhyme or reason in the world, driven by the fear that there may well be 
no such order beneath the chaos. Homo historia thus bears an uneasy relationship to the idea of 
history, which figures as both its wound and salve. Homo historia does not experience life as a 
neatly ordered succession of events, but precisely as a mounting senselessness to which the 
discourse of history offers itself as a solution. In this way, there is something of a spiritual 
dimension to the discourse of history and the work it performs, and this is even so in our 
contemporary financial times. If anything, the hopes and fears of homo historia have been 
exacerbated by various changes associated with the “ascendancy of finance.”25  
 
Homo historia in financial times 
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To describe contemporary capitalism as ‘financial’ is to suggest an epochal shift in the relations 
between finance and other spheres of human activity. Over the last few decades, it has become 
common to think of this shift as an ongoing and global process of financialization. A variety of 
institutional and technological innovations have contributed to this sensibility, ranging from the 
normalization of paper money and the collapse of the gold standard, to the creation of futures 
markets, the rise of financial derivatives in particular, and the emergence of low-risk monetary 
substitutes in the form of government bonds and other so-called safe assets.26 Collectively these 
changes reveal how financial markets are more than mere markets for loanable funds, suggesting 
an increasingly complex entanglement of finance and society. The character of this 
entanglement, however, is not something that can be put to rest by tales of expansive or intensive 
financialization. Structural categories of historical analysis like ‘capital’ (or indeed ‘the 
financial’) are means of periodizing history, and as Peter Osborne points out, all efforts at 
epochal periodization “bespeak a desire for totalization in the medium of cultural experience.”27 
This is none other than a desire for the consolations of history, the desire characteristic of homo 
historia. What concerns me in this book is the way this desire plays out today. Centuries of 
innovation may have given us an expanding array of currencies, banking operations, and 
financial instruments, but how do we, as societies that live under the sign of finance, imagine and 
negotiate our times in specifically historical terms? 
To answer this question we must eschew the usual starting points for critically theorizing 
the financial, which would have us begin with the money form, the creditor-debtor relation, the 
circulation of promissory notes, and so on. These are perfectly sensible starting points if one 
wants to understand the configuration and inner logic of a financial system, or indeed the 
relations between finance and other subsystems of society (legal, political, and so on). They are 
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less useful, however, if one wants to grasp the means through which it becomes possible to view 
society in these terms. As we have seen, to the extent that political economy is historical, it tends 
to be unreflexively so, and cannot see the position from which it orders phenomena into a 
succession of system-states, stages, or phases. Homo historia is a device through which to think 
such operations, rather than an open window onto the system-logics they allege to reveal; it is a 
means to begin mapping the speculative field of historical society, rather than a concept that 
promises to reveal the thing itself (universal history, history with a capital ‘H’, or what have 
you). With the concept, then, my aim is to begin theorizing the power of historical imagination in 
a world whose logics far exceed those of both thought and history. What I have in mind is of 
course the world of contemporary finance, and in particular the changes associated with decades 
of globalization and financialization. These are slippery terms to say the least, but there are a 
number of ways in which the discourse associated with them betrays the workings of a distinctly 
historical form of imagination. 
One is through a compulsive recourse to the concept of crisis, which has repeatedly been 
used to understand the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the re-emergence of global 
finance, and the increasingly frequent bouts of market volatility over the last thirty or so years, 
stretching back from the Latin American debt crisis of the early 1980s and the Wall Street crash 
of 1987 to the Mexican crisis of 1995, the East Asian crisis of 1997-98, and the Argentinian 
crisis of 2002, all the way up to the North Atlantic financial crisis of 2008. As Reinhart 
Koselleck reminds us, the concept of crisis is the historical concept par excellence, transforming 
uncertainty into a sense of momentous decision over which the subject of history presumes to 
preside.28 This point will be taken up in Chapter 1 through an analysis of the concept’s 
deployment by political economists, in which I argue that the history of crisis thinking provides a 
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repertoire of imagined patterns and signal events that feed back into the constitution of the 
present as a moment of crisis. The turn to crisis is in this way a turn to history, and in particular a 
call for it to provide a ground on which to act. 
Another symptomatic attachment is to the figure of the cycle, which pervades longer-
term accounts of global capitalism. Here I will give just a few indicative examples, beginning 
with one from the Marxist tradition. In The Long Twentieth Century, Giovanni Arrighi advances 
a cyclical theory of accumulation in which recurrent phases of financial expansion and collapse 
underpin broader, spatial reconfigurations of the world system.29 Many have since taken up the 
idea that the moment of finance is “a sign of autumn,” marking the last flourish of capital before 
its death and rebirth in a new spring.30 The poetics here tell all, revealing a desire for periodicity 
in the historical world comparable to the kind found in nature; a desire, it should be noted, that 
seems to obtain no matter whether one longs for a different cycle of seasons. A similar impulse 
can be found at work in the liberal tradition. Harold James, for example, has written about a 
“globalization cycle” in which the world economy oscillates back and forth between periods of 
integration and disintegration.31 This too belongs to a broader genre of cyclical world histories, 
suggesting an alternation between good times and bad that typically goes hand-in-hand with 
ideas about hegemonic rule, and which taps into a range of deep-seated myths about golden ages 
and slain saviors.32 The recovery of these myths reveals a strange continuity between the 
historical age and its religious predecessors, which as Mircea Eliade has shown, sought refuge 
time and again in the ritual repetition of mythical archetypes.33 Finally, on a somewhat more 
prosaic level, there are those cyclical patterns associated with slump and recovery, boom and 
bust, or the build-up of Ponzi-scheme finance. These are more regular patterns, imagined by 
many an economist to bubble away beneath the broader cycles described above.34  
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Each of these different figures of recurrence bear an important relation to crisis thinking, 
and I will discuss their mobilization in contemporary financial discourse in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Chapter 4 will also distinguish the figure of recurrence from that of revelation, in which the past 
is called upon to help identify new rather than old patterns in financial history. Here, however, I 
want to return to the broader idea that our financial times constitute a unique chapter in world 
history, and in particular to the narrativity of such a vision. I have already alluded to the narrative 
logic of historical reason, and this will be taken up throughout the book in connection with the 
concept of crisis and the various figures associated with it. But an affinity for narrative is also a 
more fundamental characteristic of what I am trying to foreground with the conceptual persona 
of homo historia, whose attachment to stories is everywhere accompanied by a creeping 
awareness of their inadequacy before the world. This is evident in the very terms through which 
the contemporary moment is imagined. ‘Globalization,’ for example, is not a simple and 
unmediated process, entailing the tendential integration of previously national markets for goods, 
services, or indeed capital—it is a process of spatial reorganization whose contours have been 
shaped by the stories we tell about it. There is a narrative dimension to globalization, even 
though globalization cannot be entirely reduced to a story, and this is something that 
globalization narratives struggle to grasp.35 The same goes for ‘financialization.’ Like 
globalization before it, the term has an explicitly narrative character, yielding so many stories of 
epochal change in the scale and scope of the financial industry. These stories give voice to a fear 
that finance is escaping the order of history. But at the same time, they affirm a deeper 
commitment to historical discourse as a means of negotiating our financial times. 
This dynamic is most clearly expressed in those accounts that posit a progressive 
“disembedding” or “detachment” of financial markets from other, more fundamental spheres of 
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human activity.36 Such accounts tell us that finance is emerging as an autonomous realm, 
governed not by human need or agency, but the abstract and self-referential dynamics of prices 
themselves. History, or so the story goes, is being hijacked, neutralized, or obliterated by a global 
process of financialization. Yet these same accounts rely on appeals to a bygone era when the 
‘real’ economy ruled the roost, and make promises of a time still to come, in which the tables 
will be turned and financial market logics put back in their place. In this respect, there is 
something paradoxical about many critical accounts of financialization, which purport to narrate 
a world in which things are being increasingly stripped of all narrative sensibility. Fredric 
Jameson put his finger on this when he argued that the return of ‘finance capital’ had to be seen 
in terms of its aesthetic consequences, as well as its political and economic ones. 
According to Jameson, the unshackling of money from production has been accompanied 
by a transformation in cultural logics analogous to the one undergone by money itself.37 If 
money has become more abstract, fungible, and polyvalent, then so too have our modes of 
representation, which themselves now circulate as so many modular parts on the social body of 
capital. “Stories tell themselves,” as Lyotard once put it; “they are in motion as a matter of 
principle, and their narrators are only one of their conductive valences.”38 Jameson was 
especially concerned with transformations of the image, which he saw as taking on new powers 
in the era of MTV and twenty-four hour news, but he also thought this had significant 
consequences for the narrative operation, which would no longer require the stable home of a 
fully articulated plot. With the cybernetic revolution in global media systems, he argued, 
narrative fragments have themselves acquired the price-like capacity to “soak up content and to 
project it in a kind of instant reflex.”39 This argumentation positions Jameson at the tail end of a 
boom in postmodern historical theory, in which contemporary media systems were taken to mark 
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the arrival of a ‘windless’ or ‘frozen’ present. Jean Baudrillard, for example, wrote at length 
about the undoing of representation, a process of increasing abstraction he saw as culminating in 
a transformation of the event—previously thought to be the substance of history—into an 
appearance that “only survive[s] on an artificial effervescence of signs.”40 As we will see in 
Chapter 3, for Baudrillard this amounts to an exit from history altogether, and in his own way 
Jameson says something similar, mourning the loss of “real historical time … and a history made 
by human beings.”41 But there is another way of reading these developments, not as a loss of 
history so much as a strange excess, in which the components of historical discourse come to 
acquire a new relationship with that they purport to represent, functioning as so many means 
through which ‘history’ itself is produced. It is something of irony, then, that Jameson himself 
provides a call for the kind of theoretical reorientation such a transformation requires. “What is 
wanted,” he concludes, “is an account … in which the new deterritorialized postmodern contents 
are to an older modernist autonomization as global financial speculation is to an older kind of 
banking and credit; or as the stock market frenzies of the eighties are to the Great Depression.”42 
Jameson wrote these words in 1997, before yet another wave of frenzies and a further series of 
media technology revolutions, but his call for a new cultural theory of finance capitalism still 
stands: “What we want to be able to theorize is a modification in the very nature of cultural 
tokens, and the systems they operate in.”43 In this book I aim to do something similar, linking the 
cultural logics of finance to a transformation in the nature of historical tokens and the discursive 
systems through which they circulate. Historical narratives, or fragments thereof, are one such 
token that will need to be recast in these terms, but there are others too. The concept of crisis, the 
figures with which it is associated, event names and dates, even proper names—all of these must 
be rethought as productive inputs into the process we are accustomed to calling ‘history.’ What, I 
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will ask, are the different modes of history-production embedded in financial discourse, and how 
do these enroll us into the evolving economies of contemporary finance? 
 
The strange loops of financial history 
 
At this point we run up against limits to the conventional lexicon for historical analysis, which 
would have us use just the one word, ‘history,’ in place of ‘historical imagination,’ ‘historical 
discourse,’ ‘historical development,’ and a whole host of other potential derivates. Besides 
fostering confusion, this vagueness works to maintain “the myth that the term history designates 
something real,” rather than something that must be imagined and produced.44 In this book, I 
proceed from the premise that ‘history’ is produced not only through the narrative operations of 
historical writing, as de Certeau and many others have argued at length,45 but also through a 
variety of everyday operations undertaken by homo historia. The first is a more obvious point: 
historians produce historical narratives. These can be decisive in shaping how readers understand 
the past, as well how they forge broader claims about the meanings or logics of ‘history’ as such. 
In this sense, historical discourse shapes the historical imagination as much as it is shaped by it. 
The second point is more complex, flowing from the range of historical accounts developed by 
historians over the ages. Rather than being tied to any one period or sequence of events, these 
accounts form a pool of abstract, imagined patterns that can reappear in any number of later 
presents. My argument is that such patterns themselves partake in the process that historical 
writing purports to merely describe or explain, providing individuals and groups with practical 
means of navigating temporality in specifically historical terms. In this sense, the historical 
imagination shapes what we usually think of as the process of historical change or development. 
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I am calling this broader, recursive process a ‘quasi-history’ produced through a series of strange 
loops between past and present—a strange history. 
As I noted in the preface, the concept of the strange loop is drawn from the work of 
Douglas Hofstadter, for whom it provides a means of grasping the mystery of human 
consciousness. “One day… it dawned on me,” he recalls, “that what we call ‘consciousness’ was 
a kind of mirage.” “It had to be a very peculiar kind of mirage … since it was a mirage that 
perceived itself, and of course it didn’t believe that it was perceiving a mirage, but no matter—it 
still was a mirage. It was almost as if this slippery phenomenon called ‘consciousness’ lifted 
itself up by its own bootstraps, almost as if it made itself out of nothing, and then disintegrated 
back into nothing whenever one looked at it more closely.”46 If I want to say something similar 
about ‘history,’ then it is because the phenomenon is equally slippery, seeming to belong in one 
moment to the realm of imagination but then immediately asserting itself as a reality in the next. 
The concept of the strange loop is a way of giving shape or figure to this process, suggesting a 
form of feedback that makes every attempt to imagine history a potential input back into it. A 
strange loop, then, is not just a recursive action of the past on the present, such that the present 
continually takes shape through the past, but also a loop through the abstract patterns of 
historical discourse, such that these abstractions themselves acquire real force. What this 
amounts to is precisely a quasi-historical process, wherein the various components of historical 
discourse serve as so many inputs into the production of what we usually think of as history’s 
process. 
There are a number of precedents for this move in the theory and philosophy of history. It 
is a cornerstone of the German historicist tradition, for example, that the historian is entangled 
with the present and pressed upon by the past in ways that lead to recurring re-creations of 
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‘history.’47 With the concept of the strange loop, I mean to extend this logic beyond the domain 
of the historian and his or her reader, suggesting a similar and equally important process that 
takes place between written histories. Hayden White has alluded to this in his writings on ‘the 
practical past,’ a concept he uses to distinguish the kind of past we all carry around with us in our 
heads from the one cultivated by historians (‘the historical past’).48 White’s late writings will be 
discussed at various points throughout the book, but here I want to signpost the methodological 
implications of thinking history through the figure of the strange loop.  
To begin with, the logic of the strange loop can be contrasted with the conventional 
scientific approach to historical study, which equalizes past and present by seeking out covering 
laws that apply across time. Needless to say, such an approach is unsuited to the kinds of 
questions so far raised here. The logic of the strange loop also differs from the contextualist 
approach to history, as elaborated by thinkers like John Pocock and Quentin Skinner.49 The 
defining operation of this method is a return to the past in order to sift through its specific 
horizons of meaning. To look to the past in this way is to overlook its possible reappearance and 
reinvention in a later present, which is precisely the kind of dynamic entailed in the concept of 
the strange loop. Even the genealogical tradition, popularized by Foucault and exemplified in 
Brown’s approach to neoliberalism discussed above, aims at something different, looking to the 
past as a very specific kind of precursor to the present.50 Thinking history through strange loops 
therefore requires a different approach, oriented not toward the ‘laws of history,’ the ‘truth of the 
past,’ or indeed the ‘history of the present,’ but rather, to the presence of the past, to the 
entanglements of the present, and to the ways these underpin the very production of what we 
usually term ‘history.’  
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In this book, I develop this idea in relation to economy and finance in particular, 
providing a quasi-historical account of financial capitalism in the contemporary post-crisis era. 
Rather than sifting through the various factors and processes that might have contributed to the 
bursting of the subprime bubble, I instead focus on operations in the speculative field of global 
finance since that time, tracing out the diverse and peculiar modes of history-production at work 
in contemporary financial discourse. Along the way I draw on an eclectic set of thinkers, ranging 
from Koselleck and de Certeau to Baudrillard, White, Eliade, and Deleuze, using their ideas to 
help navigate the spheres of contemporary theory, journalism, policymaking, and popular 
culture. Throughout I argue that in each of these spheres, visions and vestiges of the past 
circulate in ways that shape what becomes of the present. This occurs through a variety of 
distinct forms and contexts, ranging from the concept of ‘crisis’ itself to the figural archetypes 
embedded in public crisis narratives, from the event names or dates around which these 
narratives cluster, to the proper names and named persona that travel through film. The result, 
then, will not be an argument about the sustainability or destiny of today’s form of financial 
capitalism. It will be an experimental, mosaic-like portrait of the role that contemporary means 
of imagining and representing financial history play in the evolution of finance capitalism. In this 
sense, I have tried to write a book whose form mimics something of the dynamics I see at work 
in today’s world, where theory and practice, fact and fiction, bureaucratic and popular culture, or 
indeed any of the other ‘kinds that should not mix’ all serve as so many inputs into the strange 
history of contemporary finance. 
The remainder of the book unfolds over five chapters and three broad phases. The first 
phase consists of two chapters devoted to the conceptual entanglement of crisis and history. 
Chapter 1 develops a meta-history of the crisis concept, in which I argue that the development of 
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crisis thinking over time has effectively reconfigured the relation between crisis and history, 
turning the concept of crisis into a means of imagining and producing history. This analysis 
hinges on the claim that crisis-histories possess an indeterminate temporality, which assumes a 
particular form only through the recursive narration of both crisis and history. The argument is 
developed in the register of conceptual history, focusing on the evolution of crisis thinking in 
modern political economy. Chapter 2 then follows this idea through onto the terrain of historical 
thinking more broadly, analyzing a string of controversies regarding the status of writing, fiction, 
narrative, and the category of the event. Through these, I argue, historical discourse has 
gradually written a recursive narration of history into the very category of the event, leading it 
into a terrain where the lines between history’s imagined and developmental aspects are well and 
truly blurred. 
The book’s second phase consists of another two chapters, this time devoted to the public 
narration of financial history in terms of crisis. In particular, I focus on how received wisdoms 
about the lessons of prior crises carry over into the present as figural archetypes for imagining 
and producing particular kinds of histories. Chapter 3 does so by analyzing the status of the 
Great Depression within journalistic coverage of the subprime crisis. Here I show how the idea 
of the Great Depression served as a vector for the production of competing crisis histories, 
transmitting the figure of historical recurrence through time but doing so in diverse ways, 
yielding a shifting panorama of history on the cusp of repeating itself. Past events, I argue, can in 
this way be integral to the routine diagnosis and treatment of contemporary crisis, providing a set 
of patterns upon which to place the present within a history of familiar twists and turns. Chapter 
4 undertakes a similar analysis, only this time focusing on the discursive work of a global cadre 
of crisis managers in central banks, treasury departments, and international financial 
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organizations. Rather than recurrence alone, past crises here also transmit an archetype of 
revelation, in which events like the Great Depression and the Asian crisis are taken to uncover 
new patterns in economic and political history, as well as new practical means through which 
crises might be ‘better managed’ in the future. This analysis highlights how appeals to financial 
history can produce more than the simple threat that it might repeat itself. Through the archetype 
of revelation, I argue, past events can transform even the most unforeseen of occurrences into a 
filling-out of some long-latent destiny. When this happens, the past functions as a means of 
reinventing rather than simply reproducing existing modes of crisis management. Who (or what) 
crisis management is ultimately good for thus emerges as a crucial question for our crisis-riddled 
times. 
After this the book moves away from insider discourse on financial history and crisis, 
focusing on the pop-cultural landscape of the post-crisis era. In particular, Chapter 5 looks at 
three recent films that take finance as their theme and feature an iconic protagonist. Instead of 
appraising these films on the basis of their realism, the chapter underlines the performative force 
of the proper name within financial history. Names like ‘Gordon Gekko,’ for example, circulate 
through time across different media types and genres, taking their place alongside the ‘real’ 
names, dates, and events of history. As they do, they bring with them patterns of cause and 
consequence that serve as diagrams for distinct forms of financial conduct. This analysis points 
to a different mode of history-production, premised less on narrative archetypes than the unique 
power of names themselves. It also raises a series of speculative, ethico-political questions about 
possible futures for economy, finance, and society. These questions are taken up in a brief 
afterword that deals directly with the theme of futurity. 
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